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1 Introduction
We study implications of the choice of strategic variables, price or quantity, by rms
in a duopoly with dierentiated goods in which each rm maximizes its relative prot.
We consider general demand and cost functions, and show that the choice of strategic
variables is irrelevant in the sense that the conditions of relative prot maximization
for the rms are the same in all situations, and so any combination of strategy choice
by the rms constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium in a two stage game such that
in the rst stage the rms choose their strategic variables and in the second stage they
determine the values of their strategic variables. We dene the relative prot of a rm
as the ratio of its prot over the total prot (ratio case). But, even if we dene the
relative prot of a rm as the dierence between the prots of rms (dierence case),
we can show the same result.
In another paper, Tanaka (2013), we have shown a similar result in the dierence
case with a simple model in which demand functions are symmetric and linear, rms
have the same cost functions and their marginal costs are constant. This paper extends
this result to a case of general demand and cost functions, and we consider the ratio
case instead of the dierence case1.
In recent years, maximizing relative prot instead of absolute prot has aroused the
interest of economists. Please see Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Lu (2011), Matsumura,
Matsushima and Cato (2013), Miller and Pazgal (2001), Vega-Redondo (1997), Schaer
(1989) and Satoh and Tanaka (2013)2.
In Vega-Redondo (1997), it is argued that, in a homogeneous good case, if rms
maximize their relative prots, a competitive equilibrium can be induced. But in the
case of dierentiated goods, the result under relative prot maximization is dierent
from the competitive result.
Miller and Pazgal (2001) has shown the equivalence of price strategy and quantity
strategy in a delegation game when owners of rms control managers of rms seek to
maximize an appropriate combination of absolute and relative prots. But in their
analyses owners of rms themselves still seek to maximize absolute prots of their rms.
On the other hand, in this paper we do not consider a delegation problem, and we
assume that rms, or owners of rms, seek to maximize their relative prots.
We believe that seeking relative prot or utility is based on human nature. Even if a
person earns a large salary and if their brother/sister or close friend earns more, then
they are not suciently happy and may be disappointed. In contrast, even if a person
is very poor and if their neighbor has even less, then they may be consoled by that fact.
Our interpretation is related to the classical relative income hypothesis of consumption
1In Tanaka (2014) we analyzed a Stackelberg model of duopoly under relative prot maximization,
and have shown that the equilibrium output and price of the good of the leader and those of the
follower are equal, that is, the role of leader or follower is irrelevant to the equilibrium.
2In Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013) and Satoh and Tanaka (2013) it is assumed that each
rm maximizes the weighted sum of its absolute and relative prots. In such a case, however, the
equivalence of quantity-quantity competition, price-quantity competition, quantity-price competi-
tion and price-price competition does not hold. It holds under pure relative prot maximization
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theory by Duesenberry (1949), which states that the satisfaction (or utility) an individual
derives from a given consumption level depends on its relative magnitude in the society,
for example, relative to the average consumption, rather than its absolute level. In
addition, rms not only seek to improve their own performance but also to outperform
rival rms in the industry. The TV audience-ratings race and market share competition
by breweries, automobile manufacturers, convenience store chains, and mobile-phone
carriers (especially in Japan) are examples of such rm behavior.
In the next section we mention some related literature. In Section 3 we present the
model of this paper. In Section 4 we investigate the relationship between inverse and
ordinary demand functions. In Section 5 we analyze the choice of strategic variables in
a duopoly under relative prot maximization. In Section 6 we mention the relationship
between the dierence case and the ratio case.
2 Relation to the previous studies
There are many studies about the choice of strategic variables in a duopoly under ab-
solute prot maximization. The most famous paper is Singh and Vives (1984). They
showed that in a dierentiated duopoly if the goods are substitutes (complements), it is
a dominant strategy for each rm to choose the quantity (price) as a strategic variable.
Using a geometric analysis of a duopoly Cheng (1985) showed that if the goods are substi-
tutes (complements), Cournot equilibrium prices (quantities) are higher than Bertrand
equilibrium prices (quantities), and a quantity (price) strategy dominates a price (quan-
tity) strategy. Tasnadi (2006) formulated a model in which rms endogenously choose
strategic variables in an oligopoly where they produce homogeneous goods under ca-
pacity constraints, and showed that every rm chooses the quantity in the equilibrium.
Reisinger and Ressner (2009) analyzed a duopoly model with stochastic demand in
which rms rst commit to a strategic variable and compete afterwards, and showed
that rms set prices if uncertainty is high compared to the degree of substitutability and
quantities if the reverse holds true. Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) analyzed the endoge-
nous choice of a price or a quantity contract in a mixed duopoly with a public rm, and
showed that choosing the price contract is a dominant strategy for both rms, whether
the goods are substitutes or complements. Tanaka (2001a) analyzed an oligopoly with
dierentiated goods, and showed that quantity strategy is the best response for each
rm when all other rms choose a price strategy; thus the Bertrand equilibrium does
not constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium in a two-stage game such that in the rst
stage rms choose strategic variables and in the second stage they determine the levels
of their strategic variables. A quantity strategy is also the best response for each rm
when all other rms choose a quantity strategy; therefore the Cournot equilibrium con-
stitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Tanaka (2001b) analyzed a duopoly in which
the products of the rms are vertically dierentiated, that is, there are a high quality
rm and a low quality rm, and showed that if the goods are substitutes, a quantity
strategy dominates a price strategy for both rms. These studies are conducted under
the assumption of absolute prot maximization.
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Klemperer and Meyer (1986) presented a model where price-quantity choice does not
matter. This result is the same as ours. However, they analyzed a one-stage game in
which rms simultaneously determine strategic variables and the levels of their strategic
variables. On the other hand, other works mentioned above analyzed a two-stage game
in which rms determine their strategic variables in the rst stage, and determine the
levels of their strategic variables in the second stage. The model of this paper is also a
two-stage game.
3 The model
There are two rms, A and B. They produce dierentiated (substitutable or comple-
mentary) goods. The outputs of Firm A and B are denoted by xA and xB, the prices of
the goods of Firm A and B are pA and pB. The inverse demand functions of the goods
produced by the rms are
pA = pA(xA; xB); and pB = pB(xA; xB): (1)
From these inverse demand functions the ordinary demand functions are derived as
follows.
xA = xA(pA; pB); and xB = xB(pA; pB):
We have
@pA
@xA
< 0; and
@pB
@xB
< 0:
We assume that the eect of a change in the output of a good on its price is larger than
the eect on the price of another good. Then,@pA@xA
 > @pB@xA
 ; @pA@xA
 > @pA@xB
 ; @pB@xB
 > @pA@xB
 ; @pB@xB
 > @pB@xA
 ;
and, we have
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
> 0:
4 Relations between inverse demand functions and
ordinary demand functions
Let us investigate the relations between the inverse demand functions and the ordinary
demand functions.
First consider a case where the strategic variables of the rms are the prices. Dier-
entiating (1) with respect to pA given pB yields
1 =
@pA
@xA
@xA
@pA
+
@pA
@xB
@xB
@pA
; and 0 =
@pB
@xA
@xA
@pA
+
@pB
@xB
@xB
@pA
:
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From these equations we get
@xA
@pA
=
@pB
@xB
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
; and
@xB
@pA
=  
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
: (2)
Similarly, dierentiating (1) with respect to pB given pA, we obtain
@xB
@pB
=
@pA
@xA
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
; and
@xA
@pB
=  
@pA
@xB
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
: (3)
We have
@xA
@pA
< 0; and
@xB
@pB
< 0:
If the goods of Firm A and Firm B are substitutes, then
@pA
@xB
< 0;
@pB
@xA
< 0;
@xB
@pA
> 0; and
@xA
@pB
> 0:
On the other hand, if they are complements, then
@pA
@xB
> 0;
@pB
@xA
> 0;
@xB
@pA
< 0; and
@xA
@pB
< 0:
Also we have
@xA
@pA
@xB
@pB
  @xA
@pB
@xB
@pA
> 0:
Next consider a case where the strategic variable of one rm is the price and that of
the other rm is the quantity (output). Assume that Firm A determines the price of
its good and Firm B determines its output. The inverse demand function for Firm B is
written as follows.
pB = pB(xA(pA; pB); xB): (4)
Dierentiating (4) with respect to pA given xB, we get
@pB
@pA
=
@pB
@xA
@xA
@pA
+
@pB
@xA
@xA
@pB
@pB
@pA
=
1
1  @pB
@xA
@xA
@pB
@pB
@xA
@xA
@pA
:
From (3) we have
1
1  @pB
@xA
@xA
@pB
=
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
:
Thus, using (2),
@pB
@pA
=
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xA
: (5)
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On the other hand, the ordinary demand function of the good of Firm A is written as
xA = xA(pA; pB(xA; xB)): (6)
Dierentiating (6) with respect to xB given pA, and using (3) we get
@xA
@xB
=
@xA
@pB
@pB
@xB
+
@xA
@pB
@pB
@xA
@xA
@xB
=
1
1  @pB
@xA
@xA
@pB
@xA
@pB
@pB
@xB
=  
@pA
@xB
@pA
@xA
: (7)
Dierentiating (4) with respect to xB given pA, and using (7) we obtain
dpB
dxB
=
@pB
@xB
+
@pB
@xA
@xA
@xB
=
@pB
@xB
 
@pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xA
: (8)
Dierentiating (6) with respect to pA given xB, and using (2), (3) and (5) we obtain
dxA
dpA
=
@xA
@pA
+
@xA
@pB
@pB
@pA
(9)
=
@pB
@xB
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
 
 
@pA
@xB
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
!
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xA
=
1
@pA
@xA
:
Similarly in the case where Firm A's strategic variable is the quantity and Firm B's
strategic variable is the price,
@pA
@pB
=
@pA
@xB
@pB
@xB
;
@xB
@xA
=  
@pB
@xA
@pB
@xB
;
dpA
dxA
=
@pA
@xA
 
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xB
@pB
@xB
and
dxB
dpB
=
1
@pB
@xB
:
5 Choice of strategic variables under relative prot
maximization
In this section we analyze the choice of strategic variables by the rms. We dene the
relative prot of each rm as the ratio of its absolute prot over the total absolute prot
of two rms. However, when we dene the relative prots as the dierence between the
prots of the rms, we can show the same result.
5.1 Quantity-quantity competition
Let denote the absolute prots of Firm A and B, respectively, by A and B. Then,
A = pA(xA; xB)xA   cA(xA);
and
B = pB(xA; xB)xB   cB(xB):
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The relative prots of Firm A and Firm B are denoted by A and B. They are written
as follows,
A =
A
A + B
; and B =
B
A + B
:
Firm A determines xA so as to maximize A. The condition for maximization of A is
written as follows.
@A
@xA
(A + B)  A

@A
@xA
+
@B
@xA

= 0:
This is rewritten as
@A
@xA
B   A@B
@xA
= 0:
Similarly the condition for maximization of B is
@B
@xB
A   B @A
@xB
= 0:
Then, we have 
pA   c0A + xA
@pA
@xA

B   xB @pB
@xA
A = 0; (10)
and 
pB   c0B + xB
@pB
@xB

A   xA @pA
@xB
B = 0: (11)
5.2 Price-quantity competition
Assume that Firm A chooses the price of its good as a strategic variable, and Firm B
chooses the output as a strategic variable. In this case the absolute prots of Firm A
and B are written as follows,
A = pAxA(pA; pB(xA; xB))  cA(xA(pA; pB(xA; xB));
and
B = pB(xA(pA; pB(xA; xB)); xB)xB   cB(xB):
The relative prot of Firm A and that of Firm B, which are denoted by A and B, are
also written as follows,
A =
A
A + B
; and B =
B
A + B
:
Firm A determines pA so as to maximize A given xB. The condition for maximization
of A is written as follows.
@A
@pA
(A + B)  A

@A
@pA
+
@B
@pA

= 0:
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This is rewritten as
@A
@pA
B   A@B
@pA
= 0:
Firm B determines xB so as to maximize B given pA. The condition for maximization
of B is
@B
@xB
A   B @A
@xB
= 0:
Then, we have 
xA + (pA   c0A)
dxA
dpA

B   @pB
@pA
xBA = 0; (12)
and 
pB + xB
dpB
dxB
  c0B

A   (pA   c0A)
@xA
@xB
B = 0: (13)
From (5) and (9), we rewrite (12) as follows."
xA + (pA   c0A)
1
@pA
@xA
#
B  
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xA
xBA = 0:
Thus, the following equation is derived.
@pA
@xA
xA + pA   c0A

B   @pB
@xA
xBA = 0: (14)
This is the same as (10) which is the condition of relative prot maximization for Firm
A in the case of quantity-quantity competition.
From (7) and (8), we rewrite (13) as follows."
pB +
 
@pB
@xB
 
@pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xA
!
xB   c0B
#
A + (pA   c0A)
@pA
@xB
@pA
@xA
B = 0: (15)
From (14)
pA   c0A =
A
B
@pB
@xA
xB   @pA
@xA
xA:
Substituting this into (15),"
pB +
 
@pB
@xB
 
@pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xA
!
xB   c0B
#
A +

A
B
@pB
@xA
xB   @pA
@xA
xA
 @pA
@xB
@pA
@xA
B = 0:
Then, the following equation is derived.
pB   c0B +
@pB
@xA
xB

A   @pA
@xB
xAB = 0: (16)
This is the same as (11) which is the condition of relative prot maximization for Firm
B in the case of quantity-quantity competition.
These results mean that quantity-quantity competition and price-quantity competition
are equivalent.
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5.3 Quantity-price competition
Assume that Firm B chooses the price of its good as a strategic variable, and Firm A
chooses the output as a strategic variable. In this case Firm B determines the price of
its good given the output of Firm A, and Firm A determines its output given the price
of the good of Firm B. Interchanging A with B, by the same methods as those in the
previous subsection we can show that quantity-quantity competition and quantity-price
competition are equivalent.
5.4 Price-price competition
Assume that both rms choose the prices of their goods as their strategic variables. The
relative prots of Firm A and B are
A =
A
A + B
=
pAxA(pA; pB)  cA(xA(pA; pB))
pAxA(pA; pB)  cA(xA(pA; pB)) + pBxB(pA; pB)  cB(xB(pA; pB)) ;
and
B =
B
A + B
=
pBxB(pA; pB)  cB(xB(pA; pB))
pBxB(pA; pB)  cB(xB(pA; pB)) + pAxA(pA; pB)  cA(xB(pA; pB)) :
Firm A determines pA so as to maximize A. The condition for maximization of A is
written as follows.
@A
@pA
(A + B)  A

@A
@pA
+
@B
@pA

= 0:
This is rewritten as
@A
@pA
B   A@B
@pA
= 0:
Similarly the condition for maximization of B is
@B
@pB
A   B @A
@pB
= 0:
Then, we have 
xA + (pA   c0A)
@xA
@pA

B + (pB   c0B)
@xB
@pA
A = 0; (17)
and 
xB + (pB   c0B)
@xB
@pB

A + (pA   c0A)
@xA
@pB
B = 0: (18)
By some calculations (see Appendix) we get for Firm A
xA
@pA
@xA
+ pA   c0A

B   xB @pB
@xA
A = 0:
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This is the same as (10) which is the condition of relative prot maximization for Firm
A in the case of quantity-quantity competition.
And for Firm B we get
xB
@pB
@xB
+ pB   c0B

A   xA @pA
@xB
B = 0:
This is the same as (11) which is the condition of relative prot maximization for Firm
B in the case of quantity-quantity competition.
We have shown the following result.
Theorem 1. In a duopoly with dierentiated goods, whether the goods are substitutes or
complements, quantity-quantity competition, price-quantity competition, quantity-price
competition and price-price competition are all equivalent under relative prot maxi-
mization.
Theorem 1 means that price and output as strategic variables in the rst stage are
indierent for both rms. Thus we can conclude
Theorem 2. In a duopoly under relative prot maximization, whether the goods are
substitutes or complements, any combination of the choice of strategic variables by two
rms is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the two stage game such that in the rst stage
the rms choose their strategic variables and in the second stage they determine the
values of their strategic variables.
6 Note on the dierence case
In the dierence case, in which the relative prot of a rm is dened as the dierence
between the prots of rms, the conditions of relative prot maximization for Firm A
and B, for example, in the case of quantity-quantity competition are
pA   c0A + xA
@pA
@xA

  xB @pB
@xA
= 0;
and 
pB   c0B + xB
@pB
@xB

  xA @pA
@xB
= 0:
Comparing them with (10) and (11), if A = B, the dierence case and the ratio case
are equivalent. But , if A 6= B, they are not equivalent. In the dierence case as well as
the ratio case, however, we can show the irrelevance of the choice of strategic variables.
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7 Conclusion
We have shown that in an asymmetric duopoly with dierentiated goods under relative
prot maximization the choice of strategic variables is irrelevant in the sense that the
conditions of relative prot maximization for the rms are the same in all situations.
This result can be extended to a symmetric oligopoly in which all rms have the same
cost function and demand functions are symmetric. In an asymmetric oligopoly, however,
it may fail. It is a future issue.
Appendix: Calculation of price-price competition
Substituting (2) into (17) yields"
xA + (pA   c0A)
@pB
@xB
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
#
B + (pB   c0B)
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
A = 0:
Similarly substituting (3) into (18) yields"
xB + (pB   c0B)
@pA
@xA
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
#
A + (pA   c0A)
@pA
@xB
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
B = 0:
Rearranging the terms of these equations,
xA

@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA

B + (pA   c0A)
@pB
@xB
B + (pB   c0B)
@pB
@xA
A = 0; (19)
and
xB

@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA

A + (pB   c0B)
@pA
@xA
A + (pA   c0A)
@pA
@xB
B = 0: (20)
From (20)
pB   c0B =  
1
@pA
@xA
A

(pA   c0A)
@pA
@xB
B + xB

@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA

A

:
Substituting this into (19), and multiplying @pA
@xA
to both sides, we obtain
xAB
@pA
@xA

@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA

+ (pA   c0A)B
@pB
@xB
@pA
@xA
  (pA   c0A)B
@pB
@xA
@pA
@xB
  xBA @pB
@xA

@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA

= 0:
Then, since @pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
> 0, we get
xA
@pA
@xA
+ pA   c0A

B   xB @pB
@xA
A = 0:
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Similarly from (19)
pA   c0A =  
1
@pB
@xB
B

(pB   c0B)
@pB
@xA
A + xA

@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA

B

:
Substituting this into (20), and multiplying @pB
@xB
to both sides, we obtain
xBA
@pB
@xB

@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA

+ (pB   c0B)A
@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  (pB   c0B)A
@pA
@xB
@pB
@xA
  xAB @pA
@xB

@pA
@xA
@pB
@xB
  @pA
@xB
@pB
@xA

= 0:
Then, we get 
xB
@pB
@xB
+ pB   c0B

A   xA @pA
@xB
B = 0:
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